

SECRET

3 April 1967

TENTATIVE OUTLINE

Opening of Northern Sea Route to International Use

I. Introduction

(discusses what has happened: "The Soviets have announced. . .")
etc.; gives brief description of length, seasonal duration, etc.)

II. Historical Brief

(evolution and growth of sea route; relationship to Arctic development, northern administration, previous use by foreign ships; etc.)


III. Considerations Bearing on Decision to Open Route

("Decision may have involved weighing of many factors" etc.
This section includes an exposition of economic-geographic realities that may have a bearing on the Soviet decision, a review of territorial and security implications, and a brief mention of other possible "non-geographic" motives).

A. Geographic Realities and Economic Implications

1. Severe physical conditions (description of sea ice, weather, etc.) has necessitated huge investment in facilities to overcome them (description of icebreakers; weather reporting service; polar stations; drift stations; hydrological traverses etc.); Fees from foreign ships may help recoup part of this investment, and gain hard currency.
2. Realities of global location appear to limit potential utilization of route in world trade; tables of time/mileage distances; alternate routes, etc. Potential for gaining hard currency through tourism -- proposed "Arctic Cruise".
3. Potential for increasing development and exploitation of mineral and timber resources of Siberia. Discussion of current experience of Japanese and Scandinavian ships in the Arctic.

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- B. Territorial implications -- positive exercise of power in northern waters; sector theory; territorial waters claims; territorial claims.
- C. Security considerations -- apparent security concession; potential for electronic monitoring, etc.
- D. Propaganda ploy -- Expo '67 northlands theme; demonstration of desire to continue thaw.

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